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ABSTRACT 
Rural households in developing economies frequently use precautionary saving to cope with income risk. 
Such prudent behavior can be strengthened in transition economies where more risks are typically faced 
by households during and after reforms. This paper uses a rich panel of rural households in Zhejiang, 
China, to examine the correlation between income uncertainty and the target ratio of wealth to permanent 
income as suggested by the buffer-stock model. The empirical results suggest that Chinese rural 
households hold a significant level of wealth to mitigate the adverse impacts of income risk. Simulation 
results show that an increase in income risk leads to a sharp increase in household wealth and 
precautionary saving could drop substantially if income risk is eliminated. The high level of prudence of 
rural households under economic transition can help us better understand the developments in China, 
which will have policy implications for both developing and transition countries. 
Keywords: precautionary saving, income risk, buffer-stock model 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
It is universally observed that rural households in developing countries depend largely on precautionary 
saving to insure against various income risks (Lim and Townsend 1998; Morduch 2006). These rural 
households are exposed to a highly risky environment characterized by weather and price volatility, and 
they are further constrained by limited access to formal credit and insurance markets. However, the 
welfare loss caused by income risk is not as much as market failures would suggest, due to the adoption 
of a variety of risk management and coping strategies (Alderman and Paxson 1992; Morduch 1995). 
Precautionary saving is applied far more frequently than any other ex post coping strategies to smooth 
consumption. This is because precautionary saving as a self-insurance mechanism does not suffer from 
adverse selection and moral hazard, as it does with formal credit and insurance markets; or from limited 
commitment as in informal risk-sharing mechanisms; or from budget constraints, as in public safety nets. 
The transition from a centrally planned to a market-driven economy typically introduces more 
uncertainty to its citizens (Meng 2003). The precautionary saving behavior of its citizens is expected to 
change when faced with the transition. China’s economic reforms since 1978 are believed to have 
introduced more uncertainty to families. The implementation of the household responsibility system 
enabled rural households to get out of collectivized communes and become independent units of 
production and accounting. Free markets expanded and mandatory quotas of crop procurement were 
largely eliminated. While market institutions play an increasing role in the production and marketing of 
agricultural products and in labor allocation, rural households are also exposed to a higher level of income 
risk, compared to the pre-reform period during which risk was pooled within communes and prices were 
set by the government. An interesting question is whether rural households in China have increased their 
precautionary savings in response to the perceived rise in risk during the rapid transition. 
To address this question, the paper uses a panel data of 427 rural households from Zhejiang 
province, spanning a long period of 1986–91 and 1995–2006.
1 Zhejiang has emerged as a particularly 
successful story of economic growth over the past three decades and provides an excellent case for 
examining the precautionary saving behavior of rural households in the context of rapid transition. 
Zhejiang is located on the southeast coast of China and is endowed with limited arable lands and natural 
resources. As presented in Table 1.1, average per capita GDP in Zhejiang grew by 10.2 percent per year 
from 1984 to 2009, far above the national average growth rate of 8.9 percent. Predominately agriculture-
oriented in the early 1980s, it has now transformed into a region well-known for its prosperous private 
enterprises and specialized manufacturing clusters. The agricultural sector’s share of the economy has 
dropped from 38 percent in 1978 to 5 percent in 2009, while industry has accounted for 52 percent of the 
economy as of 2009. This growth is widespread as many rural laborers move away from agricultural 
activities, which quickly increases rural residents’ incomes. The net per capita income of rural households 
reached US$1,465 in 2009, growing at 6.8 percent annually. As a result, per capita rural income in 2009 
is more than five times the 1984 level, making Zhejiang the province with the highest per capita rural 
income in the nation. 
We aim to answer two specific questions: Do rural households use precautionary saving to 
insulate against income risk during the periods of rapid transition? If so, to what extent? Several previous 
studies have investigated the precautionary saving and consumption smoothing behavior of Chinese 
households (Kraay 2000; Jalan and Ravallion 2001; Meng 2003; Zhang and Wan 2004; Giles and Yoo 
2007). All studies except Jalan and Ravallion (2001) tested earlier predictions of intertemporal 
consumption theory under risk. They found significant evidence of consumption smoothing by Chinese 
households. However, as shown in Udry (1995), the existence of consumption smoothing does not 
necessarily imply the existence of precautionary saving behavior. Our paper makes use of the buffer-stock 
model that correctly describes the role of precautionary motive in the life cycle consumption path (Carroll 
                                                       
1 RCRE did not conduct the survey in 1992 and 1994.  The questionnaire in 1993 is very different from those of 1991 and 
1995.  We therefore exclude data in 1993.  We use the period 1986-2006 later on to refer to the period of survey used in the 
paper.    
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and Samwick 1997; Gourinchas and Parker 2002; Cagetti 2003). Furthermore, our paper differs from the 
previous literature in several aspects. First, it is focused on the rural reform characterized by the 
implementation of a contracted household production system. The proxy of income risk is extended to 
income variability to take account of the decreasing share of agricultural income as well as rural 
households’ diversified and heterogeneous income structure. Second, the calibration of the income 
process is improved. Since a moving average process exhibits much lower persistence than an 
autoregressive process even of the same order, the calibration of income process might underestimate the 
magnitude of income shocks. Instead, the dynamic structure of error terms is modeled as an 
autoregressive process in this paper, allowing the data itself to determine the orders of the process in 
estimation. Third, the positive correlation between wealth holdings and income risk was obtained through 
a quantile regression, ignoring the impact of measurement error under two restrictive assumptions. We 
expended considerable effort to search for suitable instrument variables both at the household and village 
levels and to address the attenuation bias caused by measurement error through a method of instrumental 
variables/Generalized Method of Moments (IV/GMM). We find that rural households in Zhejiang do hold 
wealth to insulate against income risk. Simulation results show that for rural households at the mean level 
of wealth, a 1/2 standard deviation increase in income risk leads to a 20.2 percent increase in total net 
wealth by rural households.  Moreover, aggregate wealth drops by 71.7 percent when the income risk of 
each household is set at the minimum level of income risk in our sample. 
Table 1.1—Economic indexes of China and Zhejiang in the post-reform period
 
   China  Zhejiang 
GDP per capita (US $ in 2009)
a      
  1984ft  440  570 
  2009  3,744  6,490 
  Annual growth rate (%)  8.9  10.2 
Per capita rural income (US $ in 2009)     
  1984  218  285 
  2009  754  1,465 
  Annual growth rate (%)  5.1  6.8 
Share of agriculture in GDP (%)     
  1978  28.1  38.1 
  2009  10.3  5.1 
Share of industry in GDP (%)     
  1978  47.9  43.2 
  2009  46.3  51.8 
Share of agriculture in total labor force (%)     
  1978  62.4  54.9 
  2009  38.1  17.2 
Share of manufacture in total labor force (%)     
  1978  20.8  31.7 
  2009  27.8  46.9 
Proportion of urban population (%)     
  1978  36.2  48.7 
  2009  46.6  57.9 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics 2010a, 2010b, 2010c. 
Notes: 
a The exchange rate is the year average of 6.831 in 2009 (National Bureau of Statistics2010b).  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical development of 
intertemporal consumption theory and the buffer-stock model.  Section 3 presents the data source and 
description. Section 4 discusses the empirical models and results. Section 5 provides further discussion on 
the estimated strength of precautionary saving in the context of existing studies. Policy implications and 
areas for future research are presented in the last section.  
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2.  THE BUFFER STOCK MODEL: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
Ever since Leland (1968) discovered that the positive third derivative of the utility gives rise to the 
precautionary motive for saving, uncertainty has been formally incorporated in models of intertemporal 
consumption optimization. This innovation greatly extends our knowledge of the life-cycle consumption 
path implied by the certainty equivalence model by decades (Browning and Lusardi 1996). The 
consumption decision under uncertainty begins with a typical dynamic utility maximization problem: 
  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑡[∑ 𝗽−𝑡𝑢(𝑐𝑡) 𝑇
𝑡=0 ] ,  (1) 
where 𝐸𝑡 is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time 𝑡, 𝑢(∙) is an additively 
separable contemporary utility function, 𝑐𝑡 is the consumption at period 𝑡, and 𝗽 = (1 + 𝗿) is a discount 
factor, 𝗿 > 0. The evolution of assets is 
  𝑤𝑡+1 = 𝑅(𝑤𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡) + 𝑦𝑡+1 ,  (2) 
where 𝑤𝑡+1 and 𝑦𝑡+1 are wealth and income at period 𝑡 + 1, and 𝑅 = (1 + 𝑟) is the gross interest rate. If 
future income is assumed to be variable but nonstochastic, for any concave utility function, a closed–form 
solution is 







𝑇−𝑡+1�[𝑤𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡 ∑ (1 + 𝑟)𝑗 ∙ 𝑦𝑡+𝑗
𝑇−𝑡
𝑗=1 ] ,  (3) 
where the optimal consumption 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑄,𝑡 is a fixed portion of the sum of current physical wealth and the 
present discounted value of human wealth. Even if income is stochastic, the solution above is also 
applicable under two assumptions: 𝑢(∙) is quadratic, and 𝑐𝑡 is allowed to range from −∞ to +∞. 
This solution is commonly referred to as the certainty equivalent model, implying that the path of 
consumption over the life cycle is independent of the path of income. After the life cycle/permanent 
income hypotheses set up the foundation for modern intertemporal consumption theory, this model takes 
a lead role in the theoretical field for three decades. However, it fails to sufficiently explain several 
stylized facts on consumption, one of which is the phenomenon that income tracks consumption closely at 
both the individual household level and the aggregate level (Carroll and Summers 1991). 
An extension of the certainty equivalent model is to allow for flexibility by defining an 
exogenous stochastic income process as 
  𝑦𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡𝜀𝑡,   (4) 
where 𝑝𝑡 is permanent income and 𝜀𝑡 is a multiplicative transitory shock to income. It is assumed that 𝜀𝑡 
follows a lognormal distribution with mean −
𝜎𝜀
2
2  and variance 𝜎𝜀




2), and thus 
log𝐸(𝜀𝑡) = 0, 𝐸(𝜀𝑡) = 1. A transitory shock affects an income stream in an ad hoc way, and does not 
improve or impair the realization of the income stream in the long run. The permanent income 𝑝𝑡 is often 
calibrated as a random walk with drift: 
  𝑝𝑡+1 = 𝑝𝑡𝑔φt+1 ,  (5) 
where 𝑔 is a growth factor, and 𝜑𝑡+1 is a permanent shock to income, also assumed to have the same 




2). Unlike transitory shocks, permanent shocks refer to any 
contingent events that permanently change the path of the income stream. 
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Based on equations (1), (2), (4), and (5), the optimal consumption path can be obtained by solving 
the following Bellman equation: 
Vt = max{ct}{u(ct) + βEt[ut+1(wt+1)]}  (6) 
  = max{ct}{u(ct) + βEt(ut+1[R(wt − ct) + ptgφt+1εt+1])}, 
where 𝑉(∙) is a value function of total expected discounted utility. Its first order condition is the general 
Euler equation 
  𝑢′(𝑐𝑡) = 𝑅𝗽𝐸𝑡[𝑢′(𝑐𝑡+1)] .  (7) 
In order to maintain such characteristics as a positive third derivative and decreasing absolute risk 
aversion, a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function is applied rather than a quadratic or 
constant absolute risk aversion utility function. But a closed-form solution could no longer be derived 
under CRRA, and studies in this area had to confine themselves to testing the implications of the Euler 
equation. Zeldes (1989) used numerical techniques to calculate an approximation to the optimal 
consumption path and found a dramatic departure from the certainty equivalence solution. Deaton (1991) 
imposes an additional assumption, 
  𝑅𝗽𝐸[(𝑔𝜑)−𝜌] < 1 ,  (8) 
where 𝜌 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. This assumption is called the impatience condition. It 
is substantially weaker than 𝗿 > 𝑟;, that is, the time discount rate is less than the interest rate. Deaton 
(1991) shows that the problem defines a contraction mapping one and that the consumption functions 
defined by the problem converge from any well-behaved initial starting function. Carroll (1997) applies 
the same assumption as Deaton (1991), named impatience, and also uses numerical technique to prove 
that expected consumption growth is a function of the ratio of wealth to permanent income, and there 
exists a target ratio where the expected growth rate of consumption is steady and slightly lower than the 
growth rate of permanent income. This is known as the buffer-stock model. The model demonstrates that 
the prudent and impatient consumers have a target wealth-to-permanent-income ratio such that, if wealth 
is below the target ratio, prudence will exceed their impatience, and the consumers will save. On the other 
hand, if wealth is already above the target ratio, impatience will exceed prudence, and the consumers will 
dissave. 
Carroll and Samwick (1997), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), and Cagetti (2003) further attempt to 
disentangle the influence of the precautionary motive from that of the life-cycle motive, as the latter is the 
predominant motive over a consumer’s lifetime under the certainty equivalence model. Their simulations 
consistently indicate that the precautionary motive largely drives a consumer’s behavior for the majority 
of his working life, while the life-cycle motive regains its leading role near his retirement at 40 to 50 
years old. Because the previously used numerical techniques are criticized as a black box, Carroll (2009) 
proposes the standard method for analyzing dynamic stochastic optimization based on contraction 
mapping theory. By building a rigorous theoretical foundation for the buffer-stock model he proves the 
existence of a target level of wealth-to-permanent-income ratio. Carroll and Toche (2010) further prove 
that an increase in uncertainty results in either an increase in the saving rate or an increase in the target 
ratio of resources to permanent income, supplying a testable hypothesis for empirically estimating the 
prudence of a given consumer. 
There also exist ample studies on precautionary saving behavior in developing countries. Based 
on the hypotheses they examined and also an evolving theory of intertemporal consumption under 
uncertainty, these studies can be categorized in three streams. The precautionary saving studies in the first 
stream test the hypothesis that rural households deplete in-kind assets after shocks, and they show that 
households use savings to smooth income fluctuations (see, for example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; 
Mogues 2011). However, a few studies in the same stream also find the limited effectiveness of those 
assets functioning as a buffer (see Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas 1998; McPeak 2004; Kazianga and Udry 
2006; McPeak 2006; Verpoorten 2009). Dercon (2005) offers three possible explanations for the  
6 
insufficient role of asset accumulation and depletion in self-insurance strategy. In the second stream, the 
precautionary saving studies respond to Paxson’s (1992) innovative work testing the implication of the 
certainty equivalence model that households consume most of their permanent income but save the entire 
transitory income (see Meng 2003). Meanwhile, another testing approach, originated from Hall (1978), 
uses the log-linearized Euler equation to examine the intertemporal consumption theory’s caveat that 
households maintain a constant marginal propensity to consume over time ( Zhang and Wan 2004; Giles 
and Yoo 2007; Lee and Sawada 2010). As Udry (1995) demonstrates, the studies from those two streams 
only provide support for the existence of consumption smoothing behavior but do not necessarily 
correspond to the existence of precautionary saving behavior. The studies in the third stream follow the 
buffer-stock model and reveal the essence of precautionary saving behavior that households save in 
anticipation of unforeseen risk (Udry 1995) or that an increase in uncertainty results in either an increase 
in the saving rate or an increase in the target ratio of resources to permanent income (Carroll and Toche 
2010). There are several studies that explicitly test these hypotheses with regard to rural households in 
developing countries, including Udry (1995); Jalan and Ravallion (2001); and Ersado, Alderman, and 
Alwang (2003). 
This paper, compared with Udry (1995) and Ersado, Alderman, and Alwang (2003), expands the 
measure of income risk from weather volatility to income fluctuations beyond weather events, accounting 
for rural households’ diversified income composition and hence heterogeneous risk profile in the context 
of rapid growth following economic reform. Similar to Jalan and Ravallion (2001), this paper constructs 
the proxy of income risk by calibrating rural households’ dynamic income process. But rather than 
imposing a two-order moving average process, we model an autoregressive process and allow the orders 
of the process to be determined by data in regression. Since a moving average process exhibits much 
lower persistence than an autoregressive process even of the same orders, their calibration of the income 
process might underestimate the welfare consequence of income shocks. Furthermore, they estimate the 
positive correlation between wealth holdings and income risk through a quantile regression and ignore the 
impact of measurement error under two restrictive assumptions. We attempt to address the attenuation 
bias caused by measurement error through an IV/GMM strategy, making considerable effort to search for 
suitable IVs both at the household and village levels.  
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3.  DATA SOURCE AND ITS DESCRIPTION 
The data for this study come from the annual national household surveys conducted in rural areas by the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s Research Center for Rural Economy (RCRE). This study uses data from 
Zhejiang province, covering 10 villages in 1986–91 and 1995–2006. The survey keeps track of 
households in the sample, unless they move out of the village or no longer have any living members. This 
allows us to record the evolution of income, consumption, and wealth holdings over a period of rapid 
economic growth. We selected a balanced panel of 427 households each year and obtained 7,686 
observations.
 There were 331 observations dropped from the sample due to violation of the impatience 
assumption of the buffer-stock model, including households that had a household head over 60 years old, 
two or fewer members, and one or fewer working members between 16 and 60 years old. Additional 
observations were dropped in log transformation, which gives us 7,302 observations for the income 
equation and 6,934 observations for the wealth ratio equation. 
Our analysis uses three sets of explanatory variables presented in empirical models initiated by 
Carroll and Samwick (1997): household characteristics, income, and wealth. Household characteristics 
include household size, age, and education of the head, and social connection dummies (that is, whether a 
household is Wu Bao Hu
2, whether a household has member in army, civil servant, Communist Party 
member, or cadre). Several variables are used to express human capital: number of laborers, highest 
education of nonhead laborers, number of laborers with skills, and number of laborers with training. 
Household land endowment includes areas of cultivated land and areas of land for horticulture, forestry, 
and ponds. Household income structure is described by four variables: number of income sources, 
primary and secondary income sources, and principal industry of on-farm business. The definitions and 
statistical descriptions of these key variables are reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, grouped into continuous 
and categorical variables. The expected signs of these variables for the econometric model are also listed 
based on economic theory and literature.   
                                                       
2 Wu Bao Hu households include the elderly, the disabled, or minors in rural areas who are without the capacity to work, 
any alternative source of income, or obligors to support them. The government provides Wu Bao Hu with food, clothes, medical 
care, housing, funeral service, and education from government.  
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Table 3.1—Definition and descriptive statistics for continuous variables 






income  total net income (US $ in 2009)
a  3,740  8,641  -9,810  228,940  /  / 
wealth  total net wealth (US $ in 2009)
a  13,953  39,252  -78,245  1,193,720  /  / 
age
b  age of the head  44.91  11.51  6
  89  inverse U  inverse U 
hhsize  household size  3.77  1.31  1  11  inverse U  inverse U 
labor  number of laborers whose age is between 16 and 60  2.63  1.16  0  8  +  / 
educ  education of the head, 1=being at school less than 6 years, 
2=6~9 years, 3=9~12 years, 4=12~16 years, 5=more than 16 
years 
2.20  0.83  1  4  +  / 
educ_high  the highest education of nonhead household laborers, the same 
definition as education of the head for its values between 1 and 6, 
and 0 indicates no labor in this household 
2.71  0.88  0  5  +  / 
labor_skill  number of laborers with skills  0.26  0.55  0  6  +  / 
labor_training  number of laborers with training  0.28  0.57  0  4  +  / 
land_cul  acreage of cultivated lands (acres)  0.33  0.42  0  11.66  +  / 
land_hor  acreage of horticultural lands (acres)  0.17  0.35  0  3.95  +  / 
land_for  acreage of forest lands (acres)  0.95  2.99  0  87.31  +  / 
land_pon  acreage of ponds (acres)  0.16  0.87  0  14.50  +  / 
growthrate  growth rate of total net income  0.51  17.01  -816  1106  +  +/- 
source  number of income sources  2.76  0.98  1  6  +  +/- 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on survey data. 
Notes: 
a The exchange rate is the year average of 6.831(National Bureau of Statistics 2010b). 
b The questionnaire during 1986–91 did not inquire age of the head, and the dataset during 1995–2002 reported the index of age sometimes for the head, but sometimes for main labor. We 
had to calculate the age of the head backward from 2003, when personal characteristics for each household member were available. This approach fails to account for the households whose 
heads were replaced between 1986 and 2002. 
9 
Table 3.2—Definition and descriptive statistics for categorical variables 






guarantees  whether being granted with a social 
welfare of five guarantees due to poverty  
0.31  -  + 
martyred  with a member being enrolled in army   1.50  +  +/- 
civilservant  with a member being a staff in an 
administrative institution in the township 
and above  
2.71  +/-  +/- 
cadre  with a member being a village cadre  5.66  +  + 
partymember  with a member being a party member  13.95  +  + 
Primary and secondary income sources
a 
agri  income from agricultural on-farm business, 








nonagri  income from nonagricultural on-farm 
business, including manufacture, 
construction, transportation, commerce, 







off-farm  income from off-farm investment, including 
managing enterprises and merchandising 















collective  Income from the collective, referring to 
wage work for collective-owned 
enterprises as well as dividend as their 







property  property income, including rent, interest, 







salary  income from being a cadre and teacher in 
village, as well as staff in an administrative 













Main industry of on-farm business 
cultivation  Cultivation  30.37  -  - 
forestry  Forestry  5.09  +/-  + 
husbandry  Husbandry  7.91  +/-  - 
fishery  Fishery  11.32  +/-  + 
manufacture  Manufacture  9.28  +  + 
construction  Construction  0.70  +/-  + 
transportation  transportation  6.74  +  + 
commerce  commerce, catering and service  12.05  +  + 
othindustry  other industries  4.68  +/-  +/- 
none  None  11.87  -  + 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on survey data. 
Notes: 
a. Since the primary and secondary income sources share most of the categorized items, we report the descriptive statistics 
on these items for the two types of income sources simultaneously, and present the percentage for the secondary income source in 
brackets. 
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Income is calculated as the sum of total net income, including the returns to endowments before 
taxes to account for income shocks, covering the profits of agricultural and nonagricultural on-farm 
business (including in-kind income), property income, income from the collective,
3 labor work and off-
farm investment, and salary as civil servants. As presented in Table 3.3, rural households in Zhejiang 
derived their income mainly from on-farm agriculture (29 percent), nonagricultural on-farm business (23 
percent), labor work (22 percent), and income from the collective (14 percent). 
Table 3.3—Income structure and variability by income sources for rural households in Zhejiang, 
1986–2006
 
  Income Structure (%)    Coefficient of Variation 
  Mean  SD    Obs  Mean  Median  SD 
Total net income   100.0  -    427  0.51  0.47  0.23 
On-farm business  52.5  64.0    427  0.86  0.73  0.77 
Agriculture  29.1  63.2    424  0.86  0.76  1.30 
   Cultivation  14.6  21.3    423  0.80  0.69  0.46 
   Forestry  3.3  11.9    160  1.81  1.73  2.49 
   Husbandry  5.5  21.4    397  3.62  1.45  63.22 
   Fishery  5.7  56.4    181  1.58  2.50  7.93 
Nonagriculture  23.4  66.1    406  1.69  1.34  1.45 
   Manufacturing  6.4  26.4    220  1.85  2.28  3.76 
   Construction  0.6  6.6    52  3.12  4.01  1.94 
   Transportation  4.2  31.0    164  3.43  2.45  16.03 
   Trade and service  8.9  28.6    301  2.34  2.36  7.14 
Off-farm investment  7.0  20.8    305  2.64  2.52  1.06 
Wage  21.5  47.6    417  1.48  1.29  0.80 
Income from the collective  13.5  28.9    407  1.88  1.72  0.79 
Salary  1.6  11.9    92  13.30  1.30  28.39 
Property income  3.9  32.2    348  2.21  2.05  1.12 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on survey data. 
Notes: Based on the balanced panel of 427 rural households. Observations of coefficient of variation refer to the number of 
sample households of nonzero income for at least one year over the whole survey period. 
The riskiness associated with various income sources is measured with coefficients of variation 
(CV) after eliminating their time trends (the right side of Table 3.3). For rural households in Zhejiang 
during 1986–2006, CV of total net income is lower than any of its components, indicating that income 
diversification is an effective way to mitigate income risks for rural households. Ranked by the riskiness 
of income sources according to their median CV, agricultural on-farm business is the least risky, followed 
by labor work, salary, nonagricultural on-farm business, and income from the collective. Property income 
and off-farm investment are the most volatile incomes with high CV values. Meanwhile, contrary to the 
riskiness of economic activities offered by traditional development literature, agricultural on-farm 
business, especially cultivation, is found to be the least volatile source of rural household income. 
                                                       
3 Income from the collective decreased sharply and became a form of welfare granted by the collective of a village as 
collective-owned enterprises went bankrupt, were sold, or were transformed into private companies in the late 1990s. We include 
income from the collective in the measure of total net income to account for its importance in the early phase of the post-reform 
period, when township and village enterprises emerged as important forces in China’s rural industrialization. As mentioned in 
Section 3, we calculate the measure of total net income as returns to endowments. When income from the collective turns into a 
form of welfare, the inclusion of this type of income in total net income will not induce bias due to its small share in net income.  
11 
Our measure of wealth is total net worth, including savings plus the stocks of consumer durables, 
houses, and productive capital assets, minus formal and informal loans. The illiquid durable asset is 
included in the calculation because it is a vital component of household wealth, and rural households can 
liquidate them to cope with emergencies even at high transaction costs. We depreciate the expenditures on 
these durable goods following Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles (2005), which assumes that consumer 
durables and productive capital assets have a useful life of 7 years and houses a life of 20 years. 
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4.  EMPIRICAL MODELS AND RESULTS 
There are four standard approaches to estimating the strength of precautionary saving: the Euler equation, 
survey evidence, structural estimation, and regression evidence (Carroll and Kimball 2008). The Euler 
equation exactly reflects the intertemporal consumption theory’s caveat that consumers attempt to keep 
marginal propensity to consume constant over time. Some of the very first applications of this method to 
agricultural economics are seen in Chen (1995) and Chen, Meilke, and Turvey (1999).  The empirical 
studies of precautionary saving could only test its log-linearized approximation with a first or second 
order Taylor expansion. The ignored terms of higher order are proven to be endogenous, and they can 
take any values to ensure that the growth rate of consumption equals the growth rate of income. This 
endogeneity makes it impossible to use the approach of the Euler equation to uncover structural 
parameters such as the coefficient of relative risk aversion (Carroll 2001). The survey evidence approach 
directly questions consumers about their optimal level of precautionary wealth and then correlates it to 
observable household characteristics.  Since it relies on a specially designed questionnaire, the survey 
evidence approach could only serve as a reference for other methods, restricting its application (see, for 
example, Kennickell and Lusardi 2004). The approach of structural estimation calibrates a dynamic 
stochastic optimization using income shocks extracted from household surveys. The regression evidence 
approach tests the central implication of the Buffer-Stock model by estimating a reduced-form equation of 
the ratio of wealth to permanent income, which indicates that increased uncertainty leads to an increased 
wealth ratio. These two approaches are parallel in empirical studies with their own methodological 
foundations. Compared to structural estimation, reduced-form regression allows the data to speak in a 
much less filtered way (Carroll and Kimball 2008) and is adopted for this study. 
To estimate how prudent rural households are, our econometric model includes two steps. First 
we calibrate a dynamic income process to construct permanent income and income risk measured by 
income variability. In the second step, we examine the determinants of the wealth ratio to test the positive 
association between wealth holdings and income risk, as proposed by Carroll and Samwick (1997). 
Calibration of the Income Process 
The measures of income risk applied in empirical studies include income variability, equivalent 
precautionary premium, subjective probability of income growth, subjective and real probability of job 
loss, and the occupation of a civil servant.  Rainfall variance is often used in development economics 
literature to reflect the risk of agricultural production. 
In the structural model of dynamic optimization presented in Section 2, income risk is introduced 
by calibrating the time-series properties of the exogenous income process, represented as permanent and 
transitory income shocks and in equations (4) and (5). For parsimoniousness, we do not decompose 
income shocks into permanent and transitory components. Instead, income risk is measured by the 
variance of the residuals obtained from the calibration of the income process, named income variability, 
for each household over the whole survey period. 
We adopt income variability to measure income risk of rural households for several reasons. First, 
the procedure of generating income variability also reveals the income dynamics of rural households and 
thus the persistence of shocks, which gives the time lags of the shocks’ welfare impacts. Second, 
compared to two indexes of subjective probability, the calculation of income variability only depends on 
the data of income and household characteristics other than those that are provided by a specially 
designed questionnaire, and thus this measure of income risk can be utilized in existing household 
surveys. Third, income variability covers the causes of income fluctuations beyond the probability of job 
loss, and it includes illness, unemployment, and macroeconomic instability. Four, rather than depending 
on any single income source, income variability captures income diversification by covering multiple 
income sources of rural households. Lastly, income variability is not limited by the weakness of rainfall 
variance when agriculture is no longer the dominating activity for the livelihood of rural households, as in 
the case of rapidly changing economies.  Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1992) criticize income  
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variability as a poor measure of income risk for urban households, citing its risk of containing variable but 
controllable components of income. The inaccuracy of income variability is less a problem for rural 
households since the income of rural households tends to be more volatile than that of urban households, 
thus it is a minor concern in the study of precautionary saving for rural households. 
There are two ways to calibrate a dynamic income process.
4 One is to use a dynamic model, 
which takes lagged dependent variables as independent variables; the other is to use an error component 
model defined by the dynamic structure of error terms. We adopt the error component model, following 
the practice in labor economics of studying wage inequality by calibrating a labor income process (see, 
for example, Guvenen 2007). The parsimonious form of the error component model decomposes log 
income into four parts: a common growing part, measured by a constant to reflect the growth of aggregate 
productivity; an idiosyncratic growing part, measured by fixed effects and explained by household 
features; a residual term evolving according to the autoregression of order one; and the residual’s 
innovations (Guvenen 2009). Rather than the moving average process (Carroll and Samwick 1997; Jalan 
and Ravallion 2001), this paper focuses on an autoregressive process, because it exhibits a higher 
persistence than a moving average process of the same order, and thus it is able to capture the persistent 
welfare effects of income shocks more accurately. 
We modify the baseline error component model to be a one-level mixed-effect linear model for 
the household panel 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝗽 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  (9) 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑎0𝑖 + 𝑎1𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑢_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡, 
εit = ∑ ψdεi.t−d + ηit,
D
d=1   
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the log of the total net income of rural household 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of household 
characteristics, human capital, land endowment, social connections, income structure, and dummies for 
villages and survey years. 𝑢𝑖 are household-specific unobservable random effects. In 𝑢𝑖, we allow a 
random intercept 𝑎0𝑖 and a random slope 𝑎1𝑖 on 𝑒𝑑𝑢_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡--—the highest education of all nonhead 
household laborers—to account for the fact that some family members who receive better education 
become principal decision makers in the household and may even replace the role of the head of the 
household. The orders of the autoregression for error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 will be determined by the regression, and 
innovation 𝜂𝑖𝑡 is assumed to be white noise. 
The estimated results of the income regression are reported in Table 4.1. Log total net income of 
rural households can be explained by an autoregression of order four, with coefficients of 0.430, 0.110, 
0.111, and 0.062, respectively. The persistence in the errors of the income process implies that an income 
shock in the current year will affect rural households’ behavioral response for the next four years. A 
simple simulation indicates that the effect of an income shock will attenuate to 43.0, 26.5, and 9.8 percent 
of its original magnitude after 1, 5, and 10 years. However, the sharp decrease in autoregression 
coefficients suggests that the persistence is much weaker than a random walk. Our results are similar to 
the findings of Jalan and Ravallion (2005) in China. They find that income can recover by 54.5 percent in 
the first year after a shock, based on a dynamic model with a one year lag in the dependent variable. 
                                                       
4 Almost all of the existing literature’s evidence on income dynamics relates to the labor income of urban households, and is 
based on the theory of human capital.  The calibration of rural household’s income requires the use of total net income, and lacks 
any such theoretical foundation.  Hence, we apply the same income calibration method for urban households to calibrate the 
income process of rural households.  
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Table 4.1—Estimation results of the income equation, dependent variable = log (total net income) 
Variable  Coefficient  S.E. 
age  0.009
*  .005 
cubic age (×10
-6)  -2.360
***  .692 
hhsize  0.468
***  .027 
squared hhsize  -0.037
***  .003 
Labor  0.117
***  .012 
Educ  0.045
***  .014 
educ_high  0.089
***  .018 
labor_skill  0.048
***  .018 
labor_training  0.033
*  .018 
land_cul  0.017
***  .004 
land_hor  0.009  .007 
land_for  0.001  .001 
land_pon  0.005
**  .002 
fiveguarentees  -0.290
**  .132 
Martyred  0.081  .068 
civilservant  0.060  .062 
Cadre  0.089
**  .044 
partymember  0.181
***  .033 
growthrate  0.003
***  .000 
Source  0.040
***  .010 
Primary income source (base = wage) 
Agri  -0.107
***  .031 
nonagri  -0.023  .033 
off-farm  0.074
**  .031 
Collective  -0.008  .030 
Property  -0.314
***  .059 
Salary  -0.023  .069 
Secondary income source (base = no secondary income) 
Agri  0.089
**  .034 
nonagri  0.021  .037 
off farm  0.196
***  .042 
Wage  0.157
***  .034 
Collective  0.151
***  .036 
Property  0.119
***  .037 
Salary  0.286
***  .068 
Main industry of on-farm business (base = cultivation) 
Forestry  0.265
***  .044 
Husbandry  0.079
**  .028 
Fishery  0.146
***  .040 
Manufacture  0.383
***  .039 
Construction  0.128  .091 
Transportation  0.389
***  .043 
Commerce  0.360
***  .037 
Othindustry  0.036  .039 
None  0.039  .036 
Constant  4.997***  .166 
Random-effects parameters     
educ_high  -1.568***  .078 
Constant  -0.489***  .085 
Correlation  -10.580  2532.387 
Residuals: AR(4)     
phi1  0.430***  .014 
phi2  0.110***  .015 
phi3  0.111***  .017 
phi4  0.062***  .016 
Log residuals  -0.437***  .014 
Observations  7302   
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
Notes:  *,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
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For household characteristics, total net income is correlated with age of the head of household 
and household size, both of which exhibit an inverse U shape, reflecting their life-cycle feature. 
Households with more laborers and higher education levels earn more net income. As hypothesized in 
human capital theory, education of the head of household, number of laborers with skills and training, and 
the highest education level of nonhead household laborers all result in higher total income, with the last 
variable contributing the most. Other household characteristics are of the expected sign as summarized in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Areas of cultivated land and ponds are significantly and positively correlated with 
total income. The households with five-guarantee status are generally low-income families, while the 
households with better social connections (with a member being a cadre or party member) earn 
significantly more than an average rural household. Higher income households report strong income 
growth and multiple income sources. Compared to the base group, which relies on labor work as the 
primary source of income, the groups depending on agricultural on-farm business and property income 
generate significantly less total net income, but the households depending on off-farm investment earn 
more. The rural households that rely on a secondary source of income other than nonagricultural self-
employment obtain significantly more income than those who derive income exclusively from a single 
source. Compared with cultivation, other primary sources of income among on-farm industries produce 
more income per household, such as (in order of profitability) transportation, manufacture, commerce, 
catering and service, forestry, fishery, and husbandry. 
Estimation of Wealth Ratio Equation 
With income variability measuring risks and permanent income measuring the long-term capacity of 
generating income, we test the positive correlation between wealth holdings and income fluctuations 
implied by the buffer-stock model (Carroll and Toche 2010). Following Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese 




𝑃� = 𝗼0 + 𝗼1ln (𝑦𝑖
𝑃) + 𝗼2𝑙𝑛(𝑣𝑖) + 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝗽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,  (10) 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑡 is total net wealth of the rural household 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝑦𝑖
𝑃 and 𝑣𝑖 are household 𝑖’s time-invariant 
permanent income and income variability during the entire sample period, 𝑀𝑖𝑡 includes household 
demographics to control life-cycle wealth accumulation, as well as the variables describing social 
connection and income structure to proxy risk preference. The hypothesis of the positive association 
between wealth holdings and income risk implies 𝗼2 > 0. 
The variable for household income inevitably contains some measurement error.  The 
measurement error introduced into income variability in the income calibrating process will affect the 
estimated coefficient of income variability in the wealth ratio equation unless either of two assumptions 
holds: the measurement error is individual-specific, time invariant, and uncorrelated with other regressors, 
or it is independent and identically distributed (Jalan and Ravallion 2001). However, these assumptions 
are rarely satisfied. If the errors are heteroskedastic across households and time variant, attenuation bias 
in the relevant estimates arises. The standard solution to the errors-in-variables problems is to estimate the 
wealth ratio equation using instrumental variables (IVs). 
In studies on urban households’ precautionary saving behavior, the IV strategy has been 
identified as one of the difficult problems in estimating the strength of precautionary saving (Carroll, 
Dynan, and Krane 2003). The first proposed set of IV in literature are occupation, industry, education, 
and their interactions with demographic variables, as they are able to reflect different lifetime profiles of 
income and uncertainty for different occupations and educational groups (Carroll and Samwick 1997, 
1998). However, this set of IV are suspected to be correlated with wealth accumulation and thus give rise 
to the problem of self-selection, because more risk-averse consumers might both hold more precautionary  
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wealth and choose occupations with lower job-loss risk (Carroll, Dynan, and Krane 2003).
5 The 
subsequent studies are inclined to use them as proxies of risk preference, and select exogenous variables 
as IV, such as the regional rate of unemployment and the regional dummy (Lusardi 1997). In the literature 
of development economics, since the majority of studies use exogenous weather events to measure 
income risk for rural households, an IV strategy is not needed in the analysis. 
Our estimation strategy is the following. First, we estimate the wealth ratio equation in the 
framework of GMM, which is robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Then, we use variables 
of social connection and income structure to proxy rural households’ risk preference, resembling the 
practice of using occupation to proxy urban households’ risk preference (for example, in Carroll, Dynan, 
and Krane 2003). At last, with little guidance offered by previous studies on rural households, we select 
IV at the household and village levels, respectively. We have also tried to find a set of IV composed of 
both household- and village-level variables, but none of them can pass the underidentification test of the 
Kleibergen-Paap Lagrange Multiplier statistic and the overidentification test of the Hansen J statistic. 
At the household level, we choose a set of IVs composed of the growth rate of income and four 
human capital variables—education level of household head, the highest education level of all nonhead 
household laborers, number of laborers with skills, and number of laborers with training. Because of the 
positive correlation between income growth and variability, the growth rate of income can be used to 
reflect income fluctuations without involving income structure directly. Human capital variables show a 
household’s capacity to adopt new technology and assume risk. 
At the village level, we choose a set of IVs describing a village’s income structure: primary and 
secondary income sources, principal industry of on-farm business, and main industry to which laborers 
are allocated. Since village information is not readily available, these village-level variables are derived 
from household-level data in our balanced panel for each village. Furthermore, we build the four indexes 
of village income structure in two ways. Taking the primary income source, for example, the first way is 
to aggregate income from each income source in a certain village, then to select the one with the highest 
level as the primary income source for this village.  The second approach is to select the primary income 
source for each rural household in a village, and then pick the one chosen by most of the households. The 
former method accounts for the high-return income source, which contributes the most to a village’s net 
income and is the one usually taken by rich households. The latter approach accounts for the profitable 
income source with relatively low entry barriers and thus is the one available to most households. We 
calculate all of the four indexes using these two methods and obtain eight variables for the set of IVs at 
the village level. 
Estimated results of the wealth ratio equation are presented in Table 4.2.
6 We first report the 
results of ordinary least square (OLS) and median regressions, which can be reasonably taken as the 
                                                       
5 The problem of self-selection is often emphasized in the literature. Fuchs-Schundeln and Schundeln (2005) even attempt to 
estimate the bias caused by this problem in a natural experiment. We argue, however, that if income structure is treated as 
exogenous, that is, under the assumption of income exogeneity, the studies on precautionary saving cannot overcome the problem 
of self-selection. Precautionary saving is an ex-post risk coping mechanism, while the self-selection of income structure (like 
occupation selection for urban households) is an ex-ante risk management strategy. If researchers are mainly interested in 
consumption smoothing with precautionary saving, rather than analyzing a simultaneous application of ex-ante and ex-post 
strategies, it is reasonable to assume the exogeneity of income structure. More specifically, the income risk in this sense is 
actually income fluctuations after income composition is determined, which is different from the income risks households face 
when determining their income portfolio. 
6 A problem in estimating the wealth ratio equation deserves some attention that is caused by log transformation on the 
dependent variable. The deletion of the observations with nonpositive wealth in log transformation might give rise to the problem 
of sample selection. Although Carroll, Dynan, and Krane’s (2003) theoretical structural model demonstrates that it is not against 
the rule of intertemporal consumption optimization for households to possess negative net worth, how to allow for the 
observations with nonpositive wealth entering into the estimation of the wealth ratio equation has become a pervasive problem 
for empirical studies. And it is also a problem for the studies on rural households in estimating the income equation whose 
income could be negative due to harvest failure, market price fluctuations, and so forth, but not for the studies on urban 
households whose labor income is always positive. The log transformation is universally adopted because it is able to transform 
the heavily skewed distribution of wealth approaching the normal distribution, thereby overcoming the impact of outliers to 
estimated results. Some studies attempt to tackle this problem with the methods other than log transformation. Fuchs-Schundeln  
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lower limit to the strength of precautionary saving due to attenuation bias caused by measurement error. 
The estimated coefficients of log income variability 𝑙𝑛(𝑣𝑖) are 0.366 and 0.325 in OLS and median 
regressions, respectively, both significant at the 1 percent level. And the coefficients of 𝑙𝑛(𝑣𝑖) in 
IV/GMM with IV selected from household (IV Model 1) and village levels (IV Model 2) are substantially 
higher at 1.935 and 3.463. The positive estimates of income variability from all the four regressions imply 
that a 1 percent increase in income variability could increase the wealth-to-permanent-income ratio 
𝑤𝑖𝑡/𝑦𝑖
𝑃 by 0.4, 0.3, 1.9, and 3.5 percent, respectively. The results confirm the hypothesis that rural 
households possess wealth to mitigate income risk. Furthermore, the estimates from IV Model 1 and IV 
Model 2 are much higher than those from OLS and median regressions, indicating possible disparities 
caused by measurement error. We prefer to report the results of IV Model 2 for reasons discussed in detail 
in the next section.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
and Schundeln (2005) use a Tobit model to include zero-wealth observations. Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (2003) apply an inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformation to allow for all the nonpositive wealth observations. A Tobit model is not applicable in this paper 
because our data are not composed of any zero-wealth observations. We have tried inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to 
transform the distribution of the wealth ratio, but the results appear to reverse the correlation between wealth holdings and 
income risks. Therefore, we resort to log transformation, and leave the problem for future exploration.  
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Table 4.2—Estimation results of the wealth ratio equation, dependent variable = log (total net wealth/permanent income) 
  OLS    Median    IV Model 1    IV Model 2 
Variable  Coefficient  S.E.    Coefficient  S.E.    Coefficient  S.E.    Coefficient  S.E. 
Lnvariability  0.366
***  .092    0.325
***  .031    1.935
*  1.004    3.463
***  1.349 
log(permanent income)  -0.527
***  .090    -0.546
***  .040    -0.387
***  .117    -0.162  .210 
Age  0.007
*  .003    0.006
***  .001    0.013
***  .004    0.017
***  .006 
Hhsize  0.156
*  .069    0.138
***  .031    0.223
***  .070    0.129  .122 
squared hhsize  -0.012  .007    -0.011
***  .003    -0.021
***  .008    -0.013  .013 
Labor  0.120
***  .020    0.109
***  .012    0.131
***  .019    0.133
***  .035 
Fiveguarentees  -0.570  .497    -0.095  .206    -0.521  .477    -0.645  .506 
Martyred  -0.264  .176    -0.101  .081    -0.292
*  .159    -0.255  .242 
Civilservant  0.142  .120    0.116
*  .070    0.175
*  .102    0.136  .176 
Cadre  0.160
*  .076    0.101
**  .048    0.278
***  .096    0.263
*  .152 
Partymember  0.122
*  .070    0.131
***  .033    0.025  .082    0.044  .134 
Source  0.002  .018    0.013  .014    0.028  .024    0.046  .038 
Primary income source (base = wage) 
Agri  -0.089  .067    -0.009  .042    -0.078  .062    -0.105  .113 
nonagri  0.126
*  .070    0.100
*  .047    0.049  .078    -0.054  .125 
Off farm  0.205
**  .066    0.115
**  .041    0.049  .112    -0.113  .151 
Collective  -0.048  .061    -0.001  .039    -0.106  .065    -0.113  .104 
Property  0.566
***  .137    0.490
***  .081    0.162  .298    -0.160  .433 
Salary  -0.013  .127    -0.045  .094    -0.018  .112    0.003  .182 
Secondary income source (base = no secondary income) 
Agri  -0.071  .080    -0.029  .049    0.004  .084    0.019  .135 
nonagri  0.014  .083    -0.030  .055    0.085  .086    0.069
*  .135 
off farm  0.116  .091    0.080  .063    0.093  .089    0.072  .156 
Wage  0.019  .083    0.019  .053    0.011  .073    -0.013  .125 
Collective  0.287
**  .090    0.256
***  .052    0.217
**  .091    0.153  .159 
Property  0.028  .129    -0.031  .097    0.094  .138    0.172  .218 
Salary  0.002  .081    -0.031  .051    0.084  .089    0.133  .140 
Main industry of on-farm business (base = cultivation) 
Forestry  0.213
*  .126    0.069  .061    0.252
**  .111    0.094  .181 
Husbandry  0.175
**  .057    0.190
***  .038    0.176
***  .049    0.147  .081 
Fishery  0.077  .097    0.200
***  .051    0.043  .079    0.025  .118 
Manufacture  0.244
**  .093    0.194
***  .054    0.212
***  .078    0.111  .124 
Construction  -0.013  .128    -0.039  .116    -0.021  .153    -0.307  .315 
Transportation  0.101  .104    0.095
*  .057    0.035  .094    -0.044  .155 
Commerce  0.331
***  .078    0.261
***  .051    0.235
*  .091    0.070  .143 
Othindustry  0.045  .093    0.100  .059    0.021  .087    -0.055  .136 
None  0.265
***  .080    0.267
***  .045    0.286
***  .071    0.227
*  .127 
Constant  2.759
***  .808    3.216
***  .332    0.684  1.445    -1.279  2.350 
Obs  6934      6934      6934      6934   
Adjusted R
2  0.4655                     
Psudo R
2        0.3263               
Centered R
2              0.2851      -0.2457   
Uncentered R
2        -      0.6475      0.3857   
Underidentification test              0.1510      0.9990   
Overidentification test        -      0.6337      0.2196   
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
Notes:  IV Model 1 and IV Model 2 refer to the IV/GMM regression with IV selected from household and village levels, respectively.  
 *,**, and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Precautionary saving itself is unobservable. The strength of precautionary saving depends not 
only on the estimated coefficient of the proxy of income risk, but also on the distribution of wealth and 
income risk across households. To gauge the strength of precautionary saving, simulation is often used in 
the literature to illustrate the change of wealth holdings in response to a certain change in income risk. For 
example, Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (2003) compared their results with those of previous studies by 
examining the percentage change of wealth in response to a 1/2 standard deviation increase in the proxy 
of income risk for the households at the median level of wealth. Carroll and Samwick (1998) and Hurst et 
al. (2010) calculated the percentage change of aggregate wealth when income risk for each sample 
household is set at the 0
th, 25
th, and 50
th percentile of the distribution of the proxy of income risk, 
respectively. Hurst et al. (2010) also calculated the percentage change of aggregate wealth when a group 
of households engaged in an occupation with low income risk is moved to another occupation with high 
income risk. As the primary income source cannot reflect the risk profile of the household precisely, we 
performed two simulations to gauge the importance of precautionary saving following Carroll, Dynan, 
and Krane (2003) and Carroll and Samwick (1998). The first simulation took the households at the mean 
level of wealth as representative for the whole sample, while the second one includes all the information 
on the distribution of wealth and income risk. The latter predicted a higher percentage change of 
aggregate wealth than the former because the distribution of wealth is generally heavily right-skewed. 
To facilitate the comparison with existing studies using different estimation strategies, we report 
the simulation results for all the four model specifications in Table 4.2. As reported in Table 4.3, for the 
first simulation, our results indicate that when income risk is completely eliminated for a representative 
household at the mean level of wealth, total net wealth drops by 10.6, 9.4, 44.6, and 65.6 percent under 
the four regressions, respectively. Total net wealth of rural households at the mean level of wealth will 
increase by 6.1 and 5.4 percent in OLS and median regressions in response to a 1/2 standard deviation 
increase in log income variability. Under IV Models 1 and 2, total net wealth can rise up to 11.8 and 20.2 
percent. 
Table 4.3—Results of two simulations on the strength of precautionary saving (%) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑣∗)
a  Change of wealth  OLS  Median  IV Model 1  IV Model 2 
Simulation 1
b 
0  decreasing  10.6  9.4  44.6  65.6 
ln (𝑣 �)




th  decreasing  10.8  9.6  52.7  71.7 
50
th  decreasing  4.2  3.7  15.8  19.5 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
Notes: .
a 𝑙𝑛(𝑣∗) is the new income risk set up in two simulations, and 𝑙𝑛 (𝑣 �) is the real income risk under OLS and median 
regressions, and predicted income risk at the second-stage regression under IV Model 1 and IV Model 2. 
b Simulation 1 is set up for rural households at the mean level of wealth, which are taken as representative households for the 
whole sample. It calculates the percentage change of wealth when 𝑙𝑛(𝑣∗) = 0 and 𝑙𝑛(𝑣∗) = 𝑙𝑛 (𝑣 �)+0.5SD. SD is the standard 
deviation of 𝑙𝑛 (𝑣 �). 
c Simulation 2 is set up for each rural household in the sample, because households at the mean level of wealth might not be a 
good representative for the whole sample due to the heavily right-skewed distribution of wealth in general. It calculates the 
percentage change of wealth when 𝑙𝑛(𝑣∗) is set at 0
th and 50
th percentile of 𝑙𝑛 (𝑣 �), respectively. 
For the second simulation, aggregate wealth drops by 10.8, 9.6, 52.7, and 71.7 percent if income 
risk is set at the 0
th percentile of log income variability, and 4.2, 3.7, 15.8, and 19.5 percent at the 50
th 
percentile of log income variability under four regressions, respectively. The results of the two 
simulations are consistent when income risk is completely eliminated or set at the minimum level in our 
sample, and the change in wealth is smaller when income risk is completely eliminated in the first  
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simulation, confirming our expectation of right skewness of wealth. Both simulation results indicate that 
the precautionary motive is an important reason for rural households in Zhejiang to hold a considerable 
amount of wealth. 
Robustness Tests 
Three tests are performed to test the robustness of estimated strength of precautionary saving. In the first 
test, we adopt relative equivalent precautionary premium as an alternative measure of income risks. The 
second test extends the wealth measures from total net worth to three other ones. Last, we trim the 
extreme values to check the impact of outliers by dropping observations with the five largest and smallest 
log wealth ratios. For all robustness tests except the first one (only re-estimated with OLS and median 
regressions), we re-estimate the OLS, median, and IV Models 1 and 2 regressions, and report the results 
in Table 4.4. The results from Table 4.2 are reproduced as baseline for easier comparison. 
Alternative Measure of Income Risk 
We have confirmed the positive correlation between wealth holdings and income variability in the 
previous discussion. Will the relation hold when income variability is replaced by another proxy of 
income risk measured by consumption fluctuations–equivalent precautionary premium (EPP)? Following 
Carroll and Samwick (1998), when utility function takes the form of CRRA, EPP is calculated as 
  𝜓 = 𝑐̅�1 − [𝐸(𝑋)−𝜌]
−
1
𝜌�,  (15) 
where 𝑐̅ is the level surrounded by a randomly distributed consumption 𝑐 with a multiplicative shock 𝑋, 
that is, 𝑐 = 𝑐̅𝑋. 𝜌 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and we assume 𝜌 to take the values of 3 and 
5. Following Carroll and Samwick (1998), we transform EPP into its unitless counterpart-relative 
equivalent precautionary premium (REPP): 
 
𝜓
𝑐̅ = 1 − [𝐸(𝑋)−𝜌]
−
1
𝜌.  (16) 
The estimated coefficients of REPP in OLS regressions are not significant but are significant in 
median regressions (top panel of Table 4.4). The coefficients are 0.204 and 0.348 when 𝜌 takes the values 
of 3 and 5, respectively. Since the baseline result from median regression falls between them, it implies 
that the coefficient of relative risk aversion 𝜌 is between 3 and 5 at the median wealth level, indicating a 
considerably high level of risk aversion and confirming the prudence of rural households. 
Alternative Measures of Wealth 
Theoretical analyses treat various assets with distinctive liquidity in the same way, ignoring transaction 
costs associated with their liquidation, which are required to buffer income fluctuations in the real world. 
In order to test whether our hypothesis still holds when wealth is measured in other forms of assets, we 
extend the definition of wealth to include other assets based on their liquidity. Saving is the most liquid 
asset, including cash in hand, savings account, grain stock, loans lent, principal, and dividend of 
insurance. It is followed by productive capital assets that are frequently exchanged as recorded in our 
dataset. Consumer durables are the least liquid asset because they will be greatly devaluated after 
purchase due to high transaction costs for liquidation. 
Asset liquidity 1 only includes saving, the most liquid component of total net worth. Asset 
liquidity 2 includes saving plus productive capital assets, and asset liquidity 3 adds consumer durables to 
asset liquidity 2. Asset liquidity 4 refers to asset liquidity 3 plus houses, which is the baseline model. This 
test can also help us detect the preferred form of assets for storing precautionary savings in rural 
households.  
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All the coefficients of income variability are significant, except those from IV Model 1 (middle 
panel of Table 4.4). They prove that regardless of the liquidity of assets, the positive association between 
wealth holdings and income risk always holds.  Furthermore, in OLS and median regressions, the 
coefficients first increase when productive capital assets are added to savings and later continuously drop 
after consumer durables and houses are added. The variation suggests that rural households in Zhejiang 
stock their precautionary wealth mainly in the form of liquid assets.  Contrary to this, the estimates in IV 
Model 2 keep rising when more illiquid components of wealth are added. This trend is opposite to the one 
reflected by the results of the OLS and median regressions, which might encourage further study on the 
portfolio choice of rural households in the presence of income risk. 
Removing Extreme Values 
Some studies estimate the wealth ratio equation by applying a quantile regression to avoid the impacts of 
outliers (Lusardi 1998; Jalan and Ravillion 2001), because the distribution of wealth can have a long tail 
to the right. To check whether outliers affect our results, we trim the full sample by deleting the 
observations with the five largest and smallest log wealth ratios. As presented in the last row of Table 4.4, 
the estimates of the four regressions are all significant and slightly different from the baseline results, 
indicating that our results are robust in spite of the outliers.  
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Table 4.4—Robustness tests
a, dependent variable = log (total net worth/permanent income) 
  OLS    Median    IV Model 1
b    IV Model 2
b   
Obs 
  Coef.  S.E.    Coef.  S.E.    Coef.  S.E.  UID  OID    Coef.  S.E.  UID  OID   
Baseline  0.366
***  .092    0.325
***  .031    1.935
*  1.004  0.151  0.634    3.463
***  1.349  0.999  0.220    6934 
Alternative measures of income risk
c 
REPP (=3)
  0.224  .260    0.204
**  .091    —  —  —  —    —  —  —  —    6934 
REPP (=5)
  0.345  .377    0.348
***  .131    —  —  —  —    —  —  —  —    6934 




***  .110    0.472
***  .046    -0.262  .286  0.062  0.345    2.649
***  .787  0.990  0.032    4582 
Asset liquidity II
  0.536
***  .107    0.521
***  .051    -0.062  .562  0.004  0.031    3.249
***  .921  0.986  0.599    4973 
Asset liquidity III
  0.532
***  .101    0.515
***  .042    0.629  .428  0.002  0.166    3.442
***  .977  0.996  0.336    5418 
Asset liquidity IV  0.366
***  .092    0.325
***  .031    1.935
*  1.004  0.151  0.634    3.463
***  1.349  0.999  0.220    6934 
Remove extreme value  0.374
***  .087    0.321
***  .028    1.961
*  1.007  0.139  0.721    3.364
***  1.196  0.997  0.085    6924 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
Notes: 
a Only estimated coefficients of the proxy of income risk are reported. The proxy of income risk is income variability except for the first set of robustness test when income 
variability is replaced by the relative equivalent precautionary premium.  
b IV Model 1 and IV Model 2 refer to the IV/GMM regression with IV selected from household and village levels, respectively. 
c REPP refers to the relative equivalent precautionary premium, and coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
d Asset liquidity I refers to savings, asset liquidity II adds productive capital assets to asset liquidity I, and asset liquidity III adds consumer durables to asset liquidity II. Asset 
liquidity IV refers to asset liquidity III plus houses, which is our baseline model. Log transformation allows 4,582, 4,973, 5,418 and 6,934 observations into the wealth ratio 
equation. 
 *,**, and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  
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5.  FURTHER DISCUSSION 
The gap between the estimates obtained from OLS/median regressions and those from IV Models 1 and 2 
reflects the possible extent of downward bias caused by measurement error. These large disparities 
between OLS and IV estimates are also observed in the existing representative studies listed in Table 5.1. 
Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1992) apply OLS and estimate that precautionary savings contribute to 
1.8 percent of wealth accumulation. Using the same measurement of income risk and the same dataset, 
Lusardi (1997) estimates the contribution of precautionary saving is 10 times larger, at 20 to 24 percent, 
based on a two-stage IV method. In addition, although these representative studies do not completely 
share the same criteria for transforming the estimated coefficients of the measures of income risk into the 
strength of precautionary saving, IV results are generally higher than those of OLS and quantile 
regressions. 
After addressing the problem of measurement error, we choose the results of IV Model 2 instead 
of IV Model 1. Idiosyncratic components of income risk are extensively documented to be larger than 
village-level common components (Dercon 2005), and we tried human capital variables as IV, which are 
widely applied and valid for urban households (see, for example, Carroll and Samwick 1997, 1998). The 
performance of IV Model 1 is, however, much less robust than that of IV Model 2 in the second 
robustness tests. The poor robustness of IV Model 1 of household IV can probably be attributed to two 
causes. First, the variables describing social connections and income structure have been used as controls 
to proxy the impacts of risk preference on wealth accumulation, leaving few candidates for IV at the 
household level. Second, an OLS regression of income variability on household characteristics indicates 
that human capital variables cannot capture rural households’ ability to take up risk: F(4,426)=0.55, 
p=0.6985. This is consistent with the fact that the majority of Chinese farmers who have accumulated 
wealth in the past three decades received relatively low levels of education (Zhang, Huang, and Rozelle 
2002). In IV Model 2, we construct IVs describing income structure at the village level to avoid using 
individual household’s income structure. This practice is motivated by the fact that income portfolios of 
rural households in a village are greatly affected by the village’s characteristics, such as natural 
endowment, technological tradition, and infrastructure.  Despite all the efforts to select suitable IVs and 
the robustness of IV Model 2, our estimated strength of precautionary saving might be somewhat 
overstated as the riskier income compositions of the rich and the majority of households in the village are 
likely overrepresented in the income structure at the village level due to our approaches of constructing 
IVs. 
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Table 5.1—Summary of existing studies on precautionary saving using the method of regression evidence 
Measures of income risks  Country  Estimation methods 
Estimated strength of precautionary saving
a 
Mean level (%)
  Aggregate level (%)
 
Income Variability         
Carroll and Samwick (1997)  U.S.  IV/2SLS  4.0  — 
Kazarosian (1997)  U.S.  OLS  14.5  — 
Jalan and Ravallion (2000)  China  Quantile  3.7   
Hurst et al. (2010)  U.S.  IV/2SLS  —  47.0(0
th)  
Equivalent Precautionary Premium         
Carroll and Samwick (1998)




Subjective Probability of Income Growth         
Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1992)  Italy  OLS  1.8  — 
Lusardi (1997)  U.S.  IV/2SLS  20.0-24.0  — 
Arrondel (2002)  France  OLS  3.9-4.6  — 
Subjective Probability of Job Loss         
Lusardi(1998)  U.S.  OLS,Quantile  0.8-1.5  — 
Probability of Job Loss         
Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (2003)  U.S.  IV/2SLS  17.0  — 
Dummy for Civil Servant         
Fuchs-Schundeln and Schundeln (2005)  Germany  OLS  22.0  — 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Notes:
a Strength of precautionary saving is gauged in two simulations: (1) Simulation 1: the percentage change of wealth for households at the mean level of wealth in a response 
to a 1/2 standard deviation increase in income variability, denoted as mean level; (2) Simulation 2: the percentage change of aggregate wealth if income risk of each household in 
the sample is set at the 0
th and 50
th percentile of income variability, respectively, denoted as aggregate level. 
b Carroll and Samwick (1998) also apply log variance of log income as the proxy of income risk. Since they gauge their strength of precautionary saving based on the estimated 
coefficient of equivalent precautionary premium, we sort this study into the category taking equivalent precautionary premium as the measure of income risk.  
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Compared to the representative studies listed in Table 5.1, the estimated strength of precautionary 
saving calculated in our simulations are among the highest. First, using the same proxy of income risk—
income variability—our estimate is higher than those that do not apply an IV strategy due to the 
distinctive estimation methods discussed above. For example, Jalan and Ravallion (2001) estimate a 
quantile regression and find that precautionary saving only takes up 3.7 percent of net worth for rural 
households in four Chinese provinces during 1985–90. This is slightly lower than the result of our median 
regression. And our data cover an additional period after 1992, during which precautionary motive is 
probably strengthened in the context of the accelerated transition to a market economy. Second, 
comparing across different proxies of income risk, our result based on income variability is larger than 
those of the subjective and real probability indexes, with the exception of Lusardi (1997).  This is because 
the former covers a wider range of income fluctuations than the latter.  Third, based on the same proxy of 
income risk, same simulation strategy, similar estimation strategy of IV estimation but using different 
IVs, our estimated strength for rural households in China is higher than that for urban households in 
developed countries. Carroll and Samwick (1998) and Hurst et al. (2010) report that aggregate wealth will 
drop by 45 and 47 percent, respectively, when income risk is set at its sample minimum. The strength of 
precautionary saving calculated in the second simulation depends on three factors: estimated coefficient 
of the proxy of income risk, the distributions of wealth, and income risk. Simply comparing the estimate 
of the proxy of income risk, our result of 3.463 is around five times that of Carroll and Samwick (1998), 
0.679. But our estimated strength of precautionary saving is only higher than theirs by roughly 60 percent. 
Without precise information on the distributions of wealth and income risk in their sample, it could only 
be speculated that wealth and/or income risk are distributed more discretely in their sample than ours. The 
gap reflects a stronger precautionary motive in rural households in Zhejiang, and this might be attributed 
to the fact that the institutions for ex post consumption smoothing besides precautionary saving, such as 
social insurance systems and rural formal credit and insurance markets, are generally less developed and 
well-functioning in most rural areas of developing countries including China. 
Other studies by Chinese scholars also reveal rural households’ prudent behavior in the post-
reform period. Du and Deng (2005) estimate a log-linearized Euler equation with time series data of 
consumption per capita from 1978 to 2002 and estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion to be 5.8. 
Wan, Shi, and Tang (2008) use a similar RCRE dataset of five provinces in 1995–2000 to estimate the 
determinants of the saving rate. They find that the households who allocate more laborers and earn more 
income from nonfarm activities maintain a significantly higher saving rate, indicating that a risky income 
structure results in higher strength of precautionary saving. Liu and Ma (2007) also estimate a wealth 
ratio equation using three waves of the China Economic, Population, Health and Nutrition Survey in 
1997, 2000, and 2004. Their estimated coefficient of the income risk proxy, deviation of real income to 
permanent income, is 8.2, reflecting a remarkable response of wealth holdings to income fluctuations. 
As observed in many developing countries, rural Chinese households rely heavily on 
precautionary saving when faced with the uncertainty introduced by economic reform, probably due to its 
lower cost relative to other ex post coping strategies, including rural formal credit and insurance markets, 
rural safety nets, labor markets, and informal risk-sharing networks within villages. These risk coping 
alternatives are undergoing transformation to align with China’s broader institutional transition. 
Rural households in China can easily access safe saving services in their respective townships, 
which are supported by extensive financial branch networks and are insured by the central government 
(Shen et al. 2010). Despite the wide coverage, credit constraints are pervasive in rural areas and the rural 
financial sector is far from a modern and efficient financial system to support economic growth in rural 
areas (Shen and Cheng 2004). Agricultural insurance is wandering between commercial and subsidized 
modes since it has been rebuilt in the post-reform period, and the majority of smallholders are 
discouraged from participating in agricultural insurance schemes (Shi and Meng 2003). Meanwhile, rural 
social security systems are struggling to adapt to the new fiscal foundation through reconstruction after 
their collapse with the communes. Rural health reform does not significantly reduce the out-of-pocket 
payments (Wagstaff et al. 2009) and the newly established safety net is only focused on meeting the food 
demands of the poor (Li et al. 2007).  
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The gradual integration of the labor market affects rural households’ ability to smooth 
consumption in two countervailing ways. On one hand, a shift in labor supply after an external shock is 
an effective coping approach (Giles 2006). On the other hand, high mobility due to migration might 
undermine informal risk-sharing mechanisms within villages (Morten 2010). The informal risk-sharing 
networks within villages are gradually replaced by impersonal market institutions. Generally speaking, 
the closer the villages are to urban areas, the more weakened the informal networks are. 
That rural households exhibit high levels of prudence in the context of institutional transition 
enables better understanding of three phenomena in China, which might have implications for other 
developing countries. First, rural households’ high level of prudence is one of the important reasons for 
the high saving rate among rural households in China. The saving rate of rural households remained at as 
high a level as their urban counterparts after compulsory force on saving was removed during the period 
of decentralization (Qian 1988). The increasing saving rate has attracted even more attention since the 
1990s, when China’s economic growth was characterized by high export and investment but low 
consumption. A strong precautionary motive due to increased uncertainty after economic reform has been 
proposed as one of the driving causes of this (Zhang and Wan 2004). Second, rural households’ high level 
of prudence contributes to rural households’ low take-up of agricultural insurance. Although agricultural 
insurance is considered to have great potential to reduce welfare loss caused by covariate weather 
variations, rural households’ low take-up of agricultural insurance is pervasive in China, as in many other 
countries. Because so far smallholders in China are still contributing the majority of several strategic 
crops, poultry, and livestock products covered by agricultural insurance, the insured income accounts for 
a limited share of total net income for those households. Thus, agricultural insurance is not an effective 
strategy to mitigate overall income risk faced by those households, and they probably resort to 
precautionary saving for better self-insurance. Third, rural households’ high level of prudence might 
undermine informal risk-sharing networks within villages.  The capacity of informal, social capital-based, 
risk-sharing networks within villages to help rural households protect against shocks have been observed 
to be weakening with the increasing penetration of marketization after economic reform in China (Lu, 
Sato, and Zhang 2008). While the enhanced mobility of village members allowed by migration 
undermines the participation in informal networks, precautionary saving could also crowd out the 
informal networks (Chandrasekhar, Kinan, and Larreguy 2009). When rural households with considerable 
wealth accumulation benefit more from precautionary saving as self-insurance, they appear likelier to quit 
the informal networks, thereby impairing those networks’ capacity to insulate against negative shocks. 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Institutional transition introduced by economic reform in the late 1970s in China brought considerable 
uncertainty to rural households. Based on a long panel of data in Zhejiang province over 1986–2006, this 
paper analyzes rural households’ precautionary saving behavior in the context of institutional transition. It 
examines the hypothesis implied by the buffer-stock model that an increase in uncertainty will result in an 
increase in the target ratio of wealth to permanent income. Our results strongly support the notion that 
rural households hold wealth to insulate against income risk, and that they exhibit a high level of 
prudence in the post-reform period characterized by high income risk. The results can be attributed to the 
relatively low cost of applying precautionary saving to insulate against income risk, compared with other 
ex post coping strategies. The results help better understanding of three phenomena in China, including 
high saving rate, low uptake of agricultural insurance, and weakening informal risk-sharing networks 
within villages. 
Our findings suggest that any development policies aimed at reducing income risk in rural areas 
should consider the fact that rural households actually acquire a wide range of risk management and 
coping strategies. As income increases and wealth accumulation accelerates in developing countries, rural 
households are more capable of smoothing consumption through precautionary saving. Thus, 
development policies should focus on mitigating severe income shocks caused by catastrophes and major 
diseases that are beyond individual household’s ability to cope and that may incur huge welfare losses. 
Additionally, in order to insulate against agricultural production risk, increasing uptake of agricultural 
insurance might be more effective in specialized production zones and for large-scale farmers. But for the 
majority of smallholders who derive income from multiple economic activities, improving the effective 
coverage of social safety nets might be more helpful than increasing the supply of agricultural insurance. 
Our results also suggest several areas for future study with respect to risk management and 
coping strategies in developing countries. While the governments in developing countries attempt to 
improve the functioning of formal insurance schemes and financial markets and extend the coverage of 
safety nets in rural areas, the effectiveness of these policy interventions is contingent upon the extent to 
which precautionary saving is crowded out by those public efforts. Meanwhile, precautionary saving can 
only act as a partial insurance at the household level. Poor households who cannot be better off with 
precautionary saving alone might be inclined to reduce their exposure to income risk through the 
strategies of income diversification and skewing, such as exchanging a decreased income level for less 
income variability, or refusing to adopt risky but profitable inputs and varieties.  Thus, studies on poor 
households’ income smoothing behavior deserve more attention to promote income mobility and reduce 
inequality in rural areas.  
27 
REFERENCES 
Alderman, H., and C. Paxson. 1992. Do the Poor Insure? A Synthesis of the Literature on Risk and Consumption in 
Developing Countries. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series WPS 1008. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
Arrondel, L. 2002. "Risk Management and Wealth Accumulation Behavior in France." Economics Letters 74(2): 
187–194. 
Benjamin, D., L. Brandt, and J. Giles. 2005. "The Evolution of Income Inequality in Rural China." Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 53(4): 769–824. 
Browning, M., and A. Lusardi. 1996. "Household Saving: Micro Theories and Micro Facts." Journal of Economic 
Literature 34(4): 1797–1855. 
Cagetti, M. 2003. "Wealth Accumulation over the Life Cycle and Precautionary Savings." Journal of Business and 
Economic Statistics 21(3): 339–353. 
Carroll, C.1997. "Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis." Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112(1): 1–55. 
________.  2001. "Death to the Log-Linearized Consumption Euler Equation! (And Very Poor Health to the 
Second-Order Approximation)." Advances in Macroeconomics 1(1). 
________.  2009. Theoretical Foundations of Buffer Stock Saving. Working paper. 
http://econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/papers/BufferStockTheory 
Carroll, C., and M. Kimball. 2008. "Precautionary Saving and Precautionary Wealth." In The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics, 2
nd ed., edited by S. Durlauf and L. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Carroll, C., and A. Samwick. 1997. "The Nature of Precautionary Wealth." Journal of Monetary Economics 40(1): 
41–71. 
_________.  1998. "How Important Is Precautionary Saving?" Review of Economics and Statistics 80(3): 410–419. 
Carroll, C., and L. Summers. 1991. "Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth: Some New Evidence." In 
National Saving and Economic Performance, edited by D. Bernheim and J. Shoven. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Carroll, C., and P. Toche. 2010. "A Tractable Model of Buffer Stock Saving." Working Paper. 
http://econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/papers/ctDiscrete. 
Carroll, C., K. Dynan, and S. Krane. 2003. "Unemployment Risk and Precautionary Wealth: Evidence from 
Households' Balance Sheets." Review of Economics and Statistics 85(3): 586–604. 
Chandrasekhar, A., C. Kinnan, and H. Larreguy. 2009. Does Savings Crowd out Informal Insurance? Evidence from 
a Lab Experiment in the Field. Working paper. 
http://ase.tufts.edu/econ/events/neudcDocs/SundaySession/Session25/AChandrasekharDoesSavingsCrowd
Out.pdf 
Chen, K. Z. 1995. "Precautionary Savings, Production, and Income Risk: Examinations of Theory and Policy", 
Doctoral Thesis submitted to the University of Guelph. 
Chen, K. Z., K. Meilke, and C. Turvey. 1999. "Income Risk and Farm Consumption Behavior." Agricultural 
Economics 20(2): 173–183. 
Deaton, A. 1991. "Saving and Liquidity Constraints." Econometrica 59(5): 1221-1248. 
Dercon, S. 2005. “Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review.” In Insurance Against Poverty, edited by S. Dercon. 




Du, H., and X. Deng. 2005. "Precautionary Saving with Liquidity Constraints and Uncertainty—An Empirical 
Analysis of Chinese Rural and Urban Households." ["Liu dong xing yue shu he bu que ding xing zhuang tai 
xia de yu fang xing chu xu yan jiu—zhong guo cheng xiang ju min de xiao fei te zheng fen xi"] China 
Economic Quarterly [Jing ji xue (ji kan)] 4(2): 297316. 
Ersado, L., H. Alderman, and J. Alwang. 2003. "Changes in Consumption and Saving Behavior Before and After 
Economic Shocks: Evidence from Zimbabwe." Economic Development and Cultural Change 52(1): 187––
215. 
Fafchamps, M., C. Udry, and K. Czukas. 1998. "Drought and Saving in West Africa: Are Livestock a Buffer 
Stock?" Journal of Development Economics 55: 273–305. 
Fuchs-Schundeln, N., and M. Schundeln. 2005. "Precautionary Savings and Self-Selection: Evidence from the 
German Reunification 'Experiment'." Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(3): 1085–1120. 
Giles, J. 2006. "Is Life More Risky in the Open? Household Risk-Coping and the Opening of China's Labor 
Markets." Journal of Development Economics 81: 25–60. 
Giles, J., and K. Yoo. 2007. "Precautionary Behavior, Migrant Networks, and Household Consumption Decisions: 
An Empirical Analysis Using Household Panel Data from Rural China." Review of Economics and 
Statistics 89(3): 534–551. 
Gourinchas, P. O., and J. Parker. 2002. "Consumption over the Life Cycle." Econometrica 70(1): 47–89. 
Guiso, L., T. Jappelli, and D. Terlizzese. 1992. "Earnings Uncertainty and Precautionary Saving.” Journal of 
Monetary Economics 30(19): 307–337. 
Guvenen, F. 2007. "Learning Your Earning: Are Labor Income Shocks Really Very Persistent?" American 
Economic Review 97(3): 687–712. 
Hall, R. 1978. "Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence." 
Journal of Political Economy 86(6): 971–987. 
Hurst, E., A. Lusardi, A. Kennickell, and F. Torralba. 2010 "The Importance of Business Owners in Assessing the 
Size of Precautionary Savings." Review of Economics and Statistics 92(1): 61–69. 
Jalan, J., and M. Ravallion. 2001. "Behavioral Responses to Risk in Rural China." Journal of Development 
Economics 66(1): 23–50. 
________.  2005. “Household Income Dynamics in Rural China.” In Insurance Against Poverty, edited by S. 
Dercon. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kazarosian, M. 1997. "Precautionary Savings—A Panel Study." Review of Economics and Statistics 79(2): 241–
247. 
Kazianga, H., and C. Udry. 2006. "Consumption Smoothing? Livestock, Insurance and Drought in Rural Burkina 
Faso." Journal of Development Economics 79(2): 413–446. 
Kennickell, A., and A. Lusardi. 2004. Disentangling the Importance of the Precautionary Saving Motive. NBER 
Working Paper Series. http://www.nber.org/papers/w10888 
Kraay, A. 2000. "Household Saving in China." World Bank Economic Review 14(3): 545-570. 
Lee, J.-J., and Y. Sawada. 2009. "Precautionary Saving under Liquidity Constraints: Evidence from Rural Pakistan." 
Journal of Development Economics 91(1): 77–86. 
Leland, H. 1968. "Saving and Uncertainty: The Precautionary Demand for Saving." Quarterly Journal of Economics 
82(3): 465. 
Li, X., Q. Dong, Q.Liu, Y. Wang, and L. Han. 2007. "The Minimal Life Guarantee (MLG) Policy: Implementation 
and Targeting in Rural Areas" ["Nong cun zui di sheng huo bao zhang zheng ce shi shi guo cheng ji miao 
zhun fen xi"].  Issues in Agricultural Economy [Nong ye jing ji wen ti] 11: 29–33. 
Lim, Y., and R. Townsend. 1998. "General Equilibrium Models of Financial Systems: Theory and Measurement in 
Village Economies." Review of Economic Dynamics 1: 59–118.  
29 
Liu, Z., and S. Ma. 2007. "Precautionary Saving of China’s Farmers: A Panel Data Analysis." ["Ji yu wei guan mian 
ban shu ju de zhong guo nong min yu fang xing chu xu yan jiu."] Journal of World Economy [Shi jie jing 
ji] 2: 40–49. 
Lu, M., H. Sato, and S. Zhang. 2008. "Does Social Capital Help Households Cope with Natural Disaster During 
Marketization? Evidence from Rural China." Paper submitted to The Emergence of China and India in the 
Global Economy Conference, http://cep.lse.ac.uk/conference_papers/03_07_2 008/Lu_M.pdf. 
Lusardi, A. 1997. "Precautionary Saving and Subjective Earnings Variance." Economics Letters 57(3): 319–326. 
________.  1998. "On the Importance of the Precautionary Saving Motive." American Economic Review 88(2): 
449–453. 
McPeak, J. 2004. "Contrasting Income Shocks with Asset Shocks: Livestock Sales in Northern Kenya." Oxford 
Economic Papers 56(2): 263–284. 
________.  2006. "Confronting the Risk of Asset Loss: What Role do Livestock Transfers in Northern Kenya Play?" 
Journal of Development Economics 81(2): 415–437. 
Meng, X. 2003. "Unemployment, Consumption Smoothing, and Precautionary Saving in Urban China." Journal of 
Comparative Economics 31: 465–485. 
Mogues, T. Forthcoming. "Shocks and Asset Dynamics in Ethiopia." Economic Development and Cultural Change. 
Morduch, J. 1995. "Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing." Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(3): 103–
114. 
________.  2006. "Micro-Insurance: The Next Revolution? " In Understanding Poverty, edited by A. Banerjee, R. 
Benabou, and D. Mookherjee. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Morten, M. 2010. "Sending Home the Riches: Informal Risk Sharing Networks and Remittances. " Working paper. 
http://mitsloan.mit.edu/neudc/papers/paper_107.pdf 
National Bureau of Statistics. 2010a. China Compendium of Statistics 1949–-2008. ["Xin zhong guo liu shi nian 
tong ji zi liao hui bian 1949-2008."] National Bureau of Statistics Publishing House. 
________.  2010b. China Statistical Yearbook, 2010. ["Zhongguo tong ji nian jian 2010."] National Bureau of 
Statistics Publishing House. 
________.  2010c. Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook 2010. ["Zhejiang tong ji nian jian 2010."] National Bureau of 
Statistics Publishing House. 
Paxson, C.  1992. "Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to Transitory Income in 
Thailand." American Economic Review 82(1): 15–33. 
Qian, Y.  1988. "Urban and Rural Household Saving in China." International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 35(4): 
592–627. 
Rosenzweig, M., and K. Wolpin. 1993. "Credit Market Constraints, Consumption Smoothing, and the Accumulation 
of Durable Production Assets in Low-Income Countries: Investments in Bullocks in India." Journal of 
Political Economy 101(2): 223–244. 
Shen, M., and E. Cheng. 2004. "Restructuring China’s Rural Financial System: Existing Approaches, Challenges, 
and the Future of Microfinance." A Background Paper Submitted to German Agency for Technical 
Cooperation. http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.26594/39.pdf 
Shen, M., J. Huang, L. Zhang, and S. Rozelle. 2010. "Financial Reform and Transition in China: A Study of the 
Evolution of Banks in Rural China." Agricultural Finance Review 70(3): 305–332. 
Shi, J., and Z. Meng. 2003. "Present Condition, Problem and Plan of Chinese Agriculture Insurance." ["Wo guo 
nong ye bao xian xian zhuang, wen ti ji dui ce yan jiu."] Issues In Agricultural Economy [Nong ye jing ji 
wen ti] 9:45–49. 
 Udry, C. 1995. "Risk and Saving in Northern Nigeria." American Economic Review 85(5): 1287–1300.  
30 
Verpoorten, M. 2009. "Household Coping in War- and Peacetime: Cattle Sales in Rwanda, 1991–2001." Journal of 
Development Economics 88(1): 67–86. 
Wagstaff, A., M. Lindelow, G. Jun, X. Ling, and Q. Juncheng. 2009. "Extending Health Insurance to the Rural 
Population: An Impact Evaluation of China’s New Cooperative Medical Scheme." Journal of Health 
Economics 28: 1–19. 
Wan, G., Q. Shi, and S. Tang. 2003. "Saving Behavior in a Transition Economy: An Empirical Case Study of Rural 
China" ["Zhuan xing jing ji zhong nong hu chu xu xing wei: Zhong guo nong cun de shi zheng yan jiu."] 
Economic Research Journal [Jing ji yan jiu] 5: 3–12. 
Zeldes, S. 1989. "Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income: Deviations from Certainty Equivalence." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 104(2): 275–298. 
Zhang, L., J. Huang, and S. Rozelle.  2002. "Employment, Emerging Labor Markets, and the Role of Education in 
Rural China." China Economic Review 12: 313–328. 
Zhang, Y., and G. Wan. 2004. "Liquidity Constraint, Uncertainty, and Household Consumption in China." Applied 
Economics 36: 2221–2229. 
  
 RECENT IFPRI DISCUSSION PAPERS 
For earlier discussion papers, please go to http://www.ifpri.org/publications/results/taxonomy%3A468. 
All discussion papers can be downloaded free of charge.  
1126.  Climate risk management through sustainable land management in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ephraim Nkonya, Frank Place, 
John Pender, Majaliwa Mwanjololo, Appollonia Okhimamhe, Edward Kato,Susana Crespo, Jupiter Ndjeunga, and Sibiry 
Traore, 2011. 
1125.  Evaluation of value-added agricultural advisory services: Case study of agriclinics in Southern India. Claire J. 
Glendenning, Kwadwo Asenso-Okyere, and Suresh C. Babu, 2011. 
1124.  Making Agriculture Pro-Nutrition: Opportunities in Tanzania. Olivier Ecker, Athur Mabiso, Adam Kennedy, and 
Xinshen Diao, 2011. 
1123.  Measuring the impacts of global trade reform with optimal aggregators of distortions. David Laborde, Will Martin, and 
Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, 2011. 
1122.  Managing future oil revenue in Uganda for agricultural development and poverty reduction: A CGE analysis of 
challenges and options. Manfred Wiebelt, Karl Pauw, John Mary Matovu, Evarist Twimukye, and Todd Benson, 2011. 
1121.  Impacts of an early education intervention on students’ learning achievement: Evidence from the Philippines. Futoshi 
Yamauchi and Yanyan Liu, 2011. 
1120.  Supply and demand for cereals in Nepal, 2010–2030. Sanjay K. Prasad, Hemant Pullabhotla, and A. Ganesh-Kumar, 
2011. 
1119.  Which trade integration scheme can best help Sub-Saharan Africa develop and export more processed agricultural 
goods?. Mathilde Douillet, 2011. 
1118.  Women cotton farmers—Their perceptions and experiences with transgenic varieties: A case study for Colombia. Patricia 
Zambrano, Jorge H. Maldonado, Sandra L. Mendoza, Lorena Ruiz, Luz Amparo Fonseca, and Iván Cardona, 2011. 
1117.  Can water allocation in the Yellow River basin be improved?: Insights from a multi-agent system model. Ximing Cai, Yi-
Chen E. Yang, Jianshi Zhao, and Claudia Ringler, 2011. 
1116.  Using the regression discontinuity design with implicit partitions: The impacts of Comunidades Solidarias Rurales on 
schooling in El Salvador. Alan de Brauw and Daniel Gilligan, 2011. 
1115.  The quiet revolution in India’s food supply chains. Thomas Reardon and Bart Minten, 2011. 
1114.  A review of input and output policies for cereals production in Nepal. Hemant Pullabhotla, Ganga Shreedhar, A. Ganesh-
Kumar, and Ashok Gulati, 2011. 
1113.  Do shocks affect men’s and women’s assets differently?: A review of literature and new evidence from Bangladesh and 
Uganda. Agnes R. Quisumbing, Neha Kumar, and Julia A. Behrman, 2011. 
1112.  Overcoming successive bottlenecks: The evolution of a potato cluster in China. Xiaobo Zhang and Dinghuan Hu, 2011. 
1111.  The impact of land titling on labor allocation: Evidence from rural Peru. Eduardo Nakasone, 2011. 
1110.  A multiregion general equilibrium analysis of fiscal consolidation in South Africa. Margaret Chitiga, Ismael Fofana, and 
Ramos Mabugu, 2011. 
1109.  How far do shocks move across borders?:Examining volatility transmission in major agricultural futures markets. 
Manuel A. Hernandez, Raul Ibarra, and Danilo R. Trupkin, 2011. 
1108.  Prenatal seasonality, child growth, and schooling investments: Evidence from rural Indonesia.  Futoshi Yamauchi, 2011.   
1107.  Collective Reputation, Social Norms, and Participation. Alexander Saak, 2011. 
1106.  Food security without food transfers?: A CGE analysis for Ethiopia of the different food security impacts of fertilizer 
subsidies and locally sourced food transfers. A. Stefano Caria, Seneshaw Tamru, and Gera Bizuneh, 2011. 
1105.  How do programs work to improve child nutrition?: Program impact pathways of three nongovernmental organization 










2033 K Street, NW 





Institute of Agricultural Economics, CAAS 
No. 176 mail box 
No. 12, Zhongguancun Nandajie 
Beijing, 10081 
China 
Email: ifpri-Beijing@cgiar.org 